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Abstract 
 
The central elements of the French concept of security are national in-
dependence, the construction of an European Europe and global ambi-
tions, and the core its security paradigm is sovereignty. Security para-
digms are general assumptions  on the mechanisms of the international 
system, from which conclusions concerning the optimal security policy 
in a concrete situation can be drawn. My thesis is that France has re-
luctantly entered into a long process of change regarding its security 
paradigm, primarily in reaction to external challenges such as the end of 
the Cold War, the reunification of Germany, the formation of a new 
security landscape and the globalization process with its effects on the 
mechanisms of the international system and the very understanding of 
security itself.  
 
However, if we look at the European and transatlantic integration proc-
ess France must cope with a growing ambivalence. On the European 
level France is more and more confronted with a federal integration 
logic, that is barely compatible with its idea of sovereignty in contrast to 
Germany, which has learned during four decades how national interests 
can be excellently preserved by pooling sovereignties. As to NATO, 
Paris on the one hand is pursuing a policy of change by rapprochement 
following the motto „if you can’t beat him join him!“. On the other 
hand it is entering a transatlantic integration scheme at the very moment 
when the US is regarded as a dominant and hegemonic power that is to 
be contained. 
 
In both cases French traditional understanding of national sovereignty is 
at stake. Whereas in the case if EU integration France is more willing to 
make concessions it stopped its process of re-integration with NATO 
because of Washington’s reluctance to reform the Alliance correspond-
ing to French ambitions of an autonomous Europe. However, the prac-
tical military cooperation is improving. Paris is preparing the ground for 
this by its radical military reform announced in February 1996 that not 
only leads to an all volunteer army specialized for interventions but has 
already resulted in new command structures for common operations 
with allies. In the nuclear field the cooperation with the UK and the US 
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grew in the 1990s but the main stumbling block remains France’s re-
luctance to join the relevant bodies of NATO’s integration structure. 
Hence, the rapprochement is a gradual one.  
 
Does this gradual change of NATO policy fit in the French security 
paradigm? From a subjective point of view it does because the policy of 
rapprochement offers some advantages such as know-how transfer in 
sensitive areas, the recourse to NATO assets and capabilities thus wid-
ening the military room of maneuver and strengthening ESDI and a 
certain convergence of interests with the main European allies UK and 
Germany. But to get these benefits Paris had to invest politically. Now it 
seems at a crossroads dealing with growing constraints and dilemmas. 
At the same time France is looking for ways to build a new Rome cor-
responding to its ambitions. If this will be a European Rome or the 
renovated  transatlantic one remains to be seen. Hence, the quarrel with 
the „hyperpower“ and symbiotic partner America will go on. 
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France and NATO: Change by rapprochement? Asterix‘ quarrel 
with the Roman empire  
 
1. Introduction 
 
When one deals with French security policy, notably with regard to the 
Atlantic Alliance, one has to start with Charles de Gaulle, the creator of 
the Fifth Republic and the spiritus rector of France’s dominant security 
paradigm. His Mémoirs d’Espoir provide the central elements of the 
French concept of security, or, to use a more common notion, its 
grand strategy: national independence, the construction of a European 
Europe and global ambitions. As to supranational approaches such as 
the EC and NATO integration, they are perceived as merely undermin-
ing the independent French nation and transferring its security to oth-
ers. Hence, the core of the French security paradigm is sovereignty and 
its underlying assumptions can be derived from the realistic school of 
thinking, for example in contrast to Germany’s security paradigm of 
integration, that can be attributed to the liberal or institutionalist ap-
proach.1  
 
Security paradigms are general assumptions  concerning the mecha-
nisms of the international system, from which conclusions concerning 
the optimal security policy in a concrete situation can be drawn.2 If one 
once more compares French and German approaches and takes the 
different concepts of Europe into account, it becomes apparent that 
France is more a proponent of confederate structures and intergovern-
mental relations whereas Germany prefers a federal, more integration 
oriented approach. As both paradigms rest in deeply rooted historic 
experiences and traditions, changes only occur very slowly, if at all, 
                                                                 
1  See Charles de Gaulle, Mémoires d’éspoir. Le rénouveau 1959-1962, Paris: Plon 
1979, pp. 180ff; 211ff. 
2  See Axel Sauder, Souveränität und Integration. Französische und deutsche Konzep-
tionen europäischer Sicherheit nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges, Baden-Baden: 
Nomos 1995, p. 36. 
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and in an evolutionary way, driven by the interaction of internal and 
external factors.  
 
My thesis is that France has reluctantly entered into such a long proc-
ess of change regarding its security paradigm,  primarily in reaction to 
external challenges such as the end of the Cold War, the reunification of 
Germany, the formation of a new European security landscape and - 
probably the most important factor - the globalization process with its 
effects on the mechanisms of the international system and the very 
understanding of security itself. At the same time, the German security 
paradigm is becoming more flexible as well, so that, especially after the 
change of government in October 1998, the probability of a reinvented 
Franco-German engagement in promoting European security is grow-
ing.3  
 
However, if we look at the European and transatlantic integration proc-
ess, France must cope with a growing ambivalence. On the European 
level France is more and more confronted with a federal integration 
logic, that is barely compatible with its idea of national sovereignty in 
contrast to Germany, which has learned during four decades how na-
tional interests can be excellently preserved by pooling sovereignties. As 
to NATO, Paris on the one hand is pursuing a policy of change by rap-
prochement following the motto „if you can’t beat him, join him!“ On 
the other hand it is entering a transatlantic integration scheme at the 
very moment when the US is regarded as a dominant and hegemonic 
power that is to be contained. 
 
In both cases French traditional understanding of national sovereignty is 
at stake. Whereas in the case of EU integration France is more willing 
to make concessions it stopped its process of re-integration with NATO 
because of Washington’s reluctance to reform the Alliance correspond-
ing to French ambitions of an autonomous Europe. So France is behav-
ing like Asterix, who although having fought successfully against the 
Roman Empire he could not change its order running always the risk of 
                                                                 
3  See Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Kontinuität oder Erneuerung? Paris und Bonn/Berlin 
nach dem Machtwechsel, in: Internationale Politik, No. 4, 1999, pp. 47 – 54. 
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either being isolated in his Gallic village or absorbed in a greater entity. 
Whereas in the comic the Gallic village stands firm against the over-
whelming power of Rome, in reality it was swallowed only to be reborn 
a couple of centuries later as a greater entity named France which is 
now supposed to pursue the mission to build a new Rome called 
Europe. 
 
This paper deals with the French policy of change by rapprochement in 
four steps. First it looks briefly at the bilateral level following the ques-
tion of how Paris eyes Washington. The following three chapters deal 
with the process of rapprochement on the political, political- military 
and the nuclear field. Finally, it ends with some tentative conclusions. 
 
2. Towards a Symbiotic Relationship with Washington 
 
A symbiotic relationship is a relation between different beings who live 
together in order to enhance their common benefit. In a way, both part-
ners depend on each other. You can exist under these circumstances 
only if there are no insurmountable contradictions and if there is enough 
complementary substance. In the past, the Franco-US relations were 
characterized by both, the will to cooperate and to cultivate the differ-
ence. When France did the latter - often in a pronounced way - this can 
be attributed to the similarities and common traits it is sharing with its 
counterpart such as 
· revolutionary traditions, 
· global ambitions, 
· the pretense of uniqueness, 
· a certain missionary zeal, 
· an inclination to power policy, 
· a preference for intergovernmentalism and 
· a strong sense of national independence. 
Thus, both countries share sovereignty as the main aspect of their se-
curity paradigm. However, American designs for integrated structures, 
be it in the Atlantic or the European context, were unacceptable to a 
considerable part of the French political class exactly because they 
were perceived as undermining French sovereignty. At the same time 
they strengthened  the American hegemony. Washington either did not 
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take part and saved its freedom of maneuver, as in the case of Euro-
pean integration, or American supremacy was guarantied, as in the case 
of NATO.4 
 
While the US can act correspondingly without  being forced to prove to 
the world its capabilities every now and then, France sometimes needs 
to play the troublemaker because it lacks the US strength by far. Al-
though the world power status has gone some time ago, Paris still 
seems to harbor feelings of envy towards the indisputable and some-
times arrogant American power. In addition, Washington is the ideal 
scapegoat for French - and not only French - frustrations. Regardless 
whether positive or negative, there is a French fixation on the US that is 
not responded to by the big brother who often enough does not even 
care. Thus, you have to tease him sometimes harder even if he be-
comes mad. In the end the US knows, that France is a reliable ally after 
all, one only needs to look toward the crises of Berlin, Iraq or Kosovo. 
 
French policy makers of course know very well that the US is what 
Madeleine Albright used to call an „indispensable nation!“ as far as 
France’s security is concerned. Although Russia is in a period of de-
cline, Washington continues to be an important strategic balancer re-
garding the remaining residual risk that might emanate from this nuclear 
superpower. The US presence in Europe helps also to alleviate hidden 
concerns regarding a stronger Germany. Finally, without US military 
capabilities – not to speak of the political leadership - the European abil-
ity for crisis management is still restricted to some minor operations in 
the low intensity spectrum. On the other hand, Washington needs Paris 
as well for at least two reasons. First, without France there will be no 
progress in European integration and as a consequence no real burden 
sharing and the pending risk of re-nationalization of the European sys-
tem. Second, France is a reliable actor once a grave security crisis oc-
curs and it has one of the biggest shares of European intervention ca-
pacities at its disposal. 
 
                                                                 
4  See Geir Lundestad, „Empire„ by Integration. The United States and the European 
Integration 1945-1997, New York: Oxford University Press 1998, p. 147ff. 
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Even if France is acting more and more in a European context, some 
fields for more or less exclusively bilateral activities continue to exist. 
To start with the UN Security Council, this field of action is of utmost 
importance for Paris because it is one of the remaining two symbols of 
the French role in world security affairs. The status of a veto power 
enables France to play its own game and to stress the difference from 
the US. As a multilateral framework the UNSC is a useful instrument to 
contain US inclination for unilateral action. Against this background 
Paris was in a somewhat ambiguous situation during the 1999 Yugoslav 
war, fighting, on the one hand, during the discussions about a new 
strategic concept against an unrestricted global role for NATO and, on 
the other, participating in the circumvention of international law by 
sidelining the UNSC.5  
 
Another still important bilateral aspect is France’s status as a nuclear 
weapon state. Although the role of nuclear weapons has diminished 
since the end of the East West conflict, the question of proliferation is 
high on the international agenda. With respect to this and to strategic 
considerations both countries are meanwhile on the same wavelength 
after having quarreled about France’s going nuclear in the 1950s and 
about different nuclear strategies thereafter.  
 
A third imminent bilateral topic is Africa. Long time neglected by the 
US, diverging strategic and economic interests seemed to clash in the 
1990s, when Washington became more involved on the „forgotten con-
tinent“ and especially in areas that the French used to regard as their 
„chasse gardée“. However, as the American engagement turned out to 
be rather modest, Paris reduced its own activities pursuing now a co-
operative approach with the US and Great Britain especially in the area 
of African peace-keeping.     
 
                                                                 
5  For the French policy in the Kosovo conflict see Simon Duke, Hans-Georg Ehr-
hart and Matthias Z. Karadi, The Major European Allies: France, Germany and 
the United Kingdom, in Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur (Eds.), Kosovo 
and the International Community: Selective Indignation, Collective Intervention, 
and the Changing Contours of World Politics, New York: The United Nations U-
niversity 2000, forthcoming.  
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According to Philippe Moreau Defarges,6 France, once having experi-
enced in the 1870/71 War with Germany that it cannot protect its terri-
tory alone, has learned some hard lessons from the US, be it the decline 
of the French plea for military assistance in 1940, the rearmament of 
Western Germany after the Second World War or the experience made 
during the Suez crisis. In all cases American interests prevailed and 
therefore France developed the following tactics to sharpen Washing-
ton’s awareness of French interests: 
· Demanding equal partnership regardless of the huge difference in 
power as in the directorate proposal of 1958; 
· contesting  American policy as for example in Africa or on the 
actual CTBT-issue; 
· seeking real independence via autonomous military means, espe-
cially by an independent nuclear deterrence; 
· balancing the US by cooperating with other great powers, such as 
Russia and China; 
· building an autonomous European pole and/or 
· behaving as a reliable and precious ally.7 
 
These strategies for dealing with America are still valid. At the begin-
ning of 1999 William Pfaff, referring to reciprocal reproaches such as 
spying on one’s industry or unprincipled political behavior, noticed that 
between French and American officials a kind of reciprocal paranoia 
had installed itself.8 More important than this day to day needling is the 
French feeling of overwhelming US power that might strengthen Wash-
ington’s inclination to unilateral actions and thereby endanger French 
interests. Foreign minister Hubert Védrine invented the notion of „hy-
perpower“ in order to describe the unique breadth of American 
strength.9 The difference to past bilateral quarreling is that for the first 
time the US is characterized as the primary international problem be-
cause of its reluctance to share power. The French recipe is the reno-
vation of the world order of the 21th century by reforming, restructur-
                                                                 
6  See Philippe Morau Defarges, Les États Unis et la France. La puissance entre 
mythes et réalités, Les notes de l’ifri, no. 14, Paris: IFRI 1999, pp. 17. 
7  ibid., p. 19 – 21. 
8  International Herald Tribune, 8 February 1999, p. 8. 
9  International Herald Tribune, 5 February 1999, p. 5. 
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ing and reinforcing international institutions. Correspondingly, President 
Chirac proposed seven principles to be reflected in the United Nations 
which are supposed to lead to a global  „collective sovereignty “.10 
 
3. Towards Political Rapprochement with NATO 
 
When France left NATO integration in 1966 it did so, for the three pre-
viously mentioned reasons. As to the goal of restoration of independ-
ence, it contained three aspects. The  political one aimed at a greater 
room of maneuver, the strategic one aimed at obtaining an equal status 
with the „Anglo-Saxons“ and the military one aimed at forming a more 
coherent role for the French military. As to the European aspect, it was 
always seen as an integral part of a transatlantic system which, how-
ever, ought to be adapted to the new international environment. De 
Gaulle’s strive for an autonomous Western Europe, be it via the 
Fouchet plans or the Franco-German Élysée Treaty, was primarily 
motivated by his interest to strengthen the French role towards the US 
while preserving the transatlantic link. When all efforts broke down,  
Paris, while remaining in the Alliance, completed its withdrawal from 
NATO integration in 1966. As the European partners were not yet pre-
pared to follow the French lead towards an autonomous Europe, France 
had to go alone hoping that one day the restricting effect of the East 
West conflict would disappear.11 
 
After two decades of being more or less a status quo power, the his-
toric changes since 1989 have paved the way for a revival of the Gaull-
ist idea of Europe.12 For France it was out of  question to rejoin the 
military integration. On the contrary, the end of the Cold War asked for 
a real reform of NATO and created the possibility for the build-up of an 
autonomous European security and defense entity. The need for this 
seemed all the more compelling against the background of German 
unification and the unpredictable future of US engagement. As to the 
                                                                 
10  International Herald Tribune, 5 February 1999, p. 5. 
11  Frédéric Bozo, Deux stratégies pour l’Europe. De Gaulle, les Etats Unis et 
l’Alliance atlantique, Paris: Plon; 1966, pp. 211-219. 
12  Two institutinal innovations occured in the 1980ties: In 1983 Paris for the first 
time hosted a meeting of the NATO Council on the ministerial level and in 1988 
it decided to attend NATO summits.  
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former, Paris, favoring strongly a CFSP in the Maastricht process, was 
a main proponent of the Treaty’s pillar structure guaranteeing an inter-
governmental approach. But although the strategic line of excluding any 
transfer of sovereignty on CFSP and the corresponding positions re-
sembled  the Fouchet plans, the evolutionary character of the CFSP left 
its ultimate definition as a policy open.13 
 
As to the future role of the US, France at first refused to concede 
NATO a role out of area. Since NATO’s London summit in 1990 Paris 
argued firmly against a politicization of what it believed was a pure 
military organization that should be confined to Article 5 tasks leaving 
the rest to the Europeans and the WEU as their future military branch 
situated outside NATO. Correspondingly, it only very reluctantly ac-
cepted the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), 
NATO enlargement and non-article 5 tasks for NATO. But the evolution 
of the violent conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a main factor in 
bringing about a certain rapprochement on the institutional level. In 
1993 Paris started to attend meetings of the military committee when 
non-article 5 tasks were on the agenda, and two years later it resumed 
its seat completely. In September 1994 the French defense minister 
took part in an informal NATO meeting for the first time and later on in 
official ones.14 
 
France’s acceptance of a wider NATO role, however, has to be seen in 
the context of a European parallelism, i.e. each step towards NATO 
was combined with if not outflanked by progress in European security 
cooperation. For example 
· Paris participated actively in the deliberations on the 1991 strategic 
concept of NATO and NATO officially accepted the goal of a 
European security and defense identity (ESDI) as well as an en-
hanced role of the WEU.  
· The acceptance of a NATO role in regional crisis management in 
an OSCE and UN framework was matched by the Petersberg dec-
                                                                 
13  See Collette Mazzucelli, France and Germany at Maastricht. Politics and Negotia-
tians to Create the European Union, New York: Garland Publishing 1997, p. 159. 
14  See Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Frankreichs Flirt mit der NATO, in: Blätter für deutsche 
und internationale Politik, Nr. 2, 1996, pp. 144-148. 
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laration of 19 June 1992 that set out, on the basis of the Maastricht 
Treaty, the guidelines for the future of the WEU, whose member 
states declared their preparedness to make available military units 
for the so called Petersberg missions consisting of humanitarian 
and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces 
in crisis management including peaceenforcement under the au-
thority of the WEU.  
· NATO’s basic decision of January 1994 to open up the Alliance 
for new members from Central and Eastern Europe was followed 
in May by the WEU offer of the status of „associate  partner“ for 
those countries which had signed „Europe Agreements“ with the 
EU.  
· The new NATO members Poland, Czeck Republic and Hungary 
became associated members of the WEU in May 1999. 
 
While President Mitterrand pursued a strategy of building an autono-
mous European security and defense entity outside NATO via WEU, his 
successor finally changed this course in 1995. Europe’s failure to react 
adequately to the conflict in former Yugoslavia, the reduction of military 
spending in the European partner countries and their firm will to place 
themselves „more than ever under American protection, incarnated by 
NATO“ already in 1993 led Chirac to the conclusion, „that if France 
wants to play a determining role in the creation of a European defense 
entity, it must take into account this state of mind of its partners, and 
reconsider to a large degree the form of its relations with NATO. It is 
clear, in effect, that the necessary re-balancing of relations within the 
Atlantic Alliance, relying on existing European institutions such as the 
WEU, can only take place from inside, not against the United States, but 
in agreement with it“.15 
 
This analysis was supported by the experience of US reluctance to 
become fully engaged in the Bosnian conflict, so that Paris now seemed 
rather worried about US disengagement than about US hegemony. 
Thus, France perceived NATO no more as an obstacle but as a neces-
                                                                 
15  Chirac quoted in Robert P. Grant, France’s New Relationship with NATO, Survi-
val, No. 1, Spring 1996, p. 63. 
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sary instrument to ESDI. But it linked further steps of rapprochement 
beyond the decisions of 5 December 1995 with the scope of a real re-
form of the NATO command structure.16 
 
With Hervé de Charette’s announcement Paris chose the only option, 
that was realistic in terms of domestic constraints and of its political 
bargaining position with NATO. The maximalist stance of Mitterrand 
had turned out to be counterproductive and a complete reintegration 
would have been incompatible with the goal of reducing US influence 
by means of ESDI. A policy of step by step rapprochement, however, 
allowed an evolutionary process towards an autonomous European 
defense capacity while respecting French independence with regard to 
NATO’s military integration. However, as the results were deemed 
insufficient and as Chirac, after his miscalculation of dissolving the 
National Assembly, was forced to govern with a more NATO critical 
socialist-led leftist government Paris froze this process in 1997.  
 
This does not mean that France renounced to push its European ap-
proach by furthering CFSP. So the Petersberg tasks were integrated in 
the Amsterdam Treaty which among other things contains provisions 
leading to a strengthening of the European Council by placing the guide-
line competence for CFSP and defense matters, including WEU, in its 
hands. As to the Secretary General of the Council and High Representa-
tive of CFSP, in short Mr. CFSP,  France achieved its aim that a per-
sonality of high international standing be chosen who could one day 
play a similar role as the Secretary General of NATO. A Strategy Plan-
ning and Early Warning Unit composed of personnel from the Council, 
the Commission, the member states and the WEU will be at his dis-
posal. Thus, Amsterdam was another step in reforming the EU’s future 
defense policy, but not more.17 
 
The Kosovo crisis gave a new push to both French-NATO and Euro-
pean security cooperation. One reason for France’s support of the side-
                                                                 
16  See Rede des französischen Außenministers bei der Ministertagung des Nordatlan-
tikrates am 5.12.1995 in: Frankreich-Info, No. 37, 11 December 1995, p. 3. 
17  See Europäisches Parlament, Bericht über die Schaffung einer gemeinsamen Ver-
teidigungspolitik der Europäischen Union, A4-0171/98, 30 April 1998. 
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lining of the UN had to do with ESDI and the related French leadership 
ambition. Therefore  it was determined to play a considerable role in the 
armed conflict right from the beginning. Consequently, France assumed 
the biggest European share of NATO’s military activities, taking on 
12.8 per cent of the air raids and 20.2 per cent of the reconnaissance 
photography.18 Inside the alliance, many important decisions in select-
ing sensitive targets with civilian character to be bombed were made by 
the US, Great Britain and France.   
 
Following the French understanding of political control, obtaining veto 
power over military operations was an unwritten precondition for inten-
sifying Operation Allied Force.19 Nevertheless part of the military opera-
tions were conducted by the US outside the NATO framework behind 
the back of the allies not at least in order to circumvent a French veto. 
Thus, France learnt that its distrust in the ability of American coopera-
tion were confirmed and, as Defense Minister Alain Richard put it ironi-
cally, that „there was another country not fully integrated into the alli-
ance – the United States.“20 
 
The war against Yugoslavia taught the Europeans a lot about their mili-
tary deficiencies. The military technological gap between EU countries 
and the US is becoming a gulf endangering not only the interoperability 
with US forces but also the standing of  the Europeans in the decision 
making process. Correspondingly, NATO’s new strategic concept of 
April 1999 defined detailed guidelines for the modernization of the 
armed forces which the member countries vowed to implement.21 This 
requirement met with French thinking of the importance of European 
military capabilities that has been translated into the controversial pro-
posal of defining  convergence criteria. 
 
Driven by a change of the British ESDI approach and the French-British 
declaration of St. Malo22, the European Council decided at its Cologne 
                                                                 
18  Le Monde, 23 June 1999, p. 7. 
19  International Herald Tribune, 21 September 1999, p. 1, 7 
20  Cited in International Herald Tribune, 11 November 1999, p. 4. 
21  See Erklärung von Washington and part IV of the Strategic Concept. 
22  See Peter Schmidt, Neuorientierung in der europäischen Sicherheitspolitik? Brit i-
sche und britisch-französische Initiativen, SWP-AP 3088, Januar 1999. 
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summit to strengthen the European military means - especially concern-
ing strategic lift, strategic reconnaissance, modernization of the armed 
forces as well as command and control - in order to become able to act 
autonomously in the whole range of the Petersberg tasks. Paris trans-
lated these demands in a more concrete action plan in July 1999, and 
London proposed a step-by-step plan in November 1999 leading to 
European military capacities and command structures. Furthermore a 
new step was taken towards the integration until the end of 2000 of 
those WEU capabilities into the EU that are necessary for the EU’s new 
responsibilities in the context of the Petersberg tasks. Finally Javier 
Solana, who acted as Mr. CFSP since 18 October 1999, was also ap-
pointed Secretary General of WEU. Thus, from a political point of 
view, a two pillar structure of the Alliance could emerge that coincides 
with French ideas and interests. 
  
4. Towards Political-Military Rapprochement with NATO 
 
When French decision makers talk of the Atlantic Alliance, they usually 
mean a traditional military alliance of collective defense whereas NATO 
is equated with  US dominated military integration. The end of the East 
West Conflict  was perceived as a radical change which required a 
corresponding adaptation  of NATO becoming again an international 
body with joint planning capabilities and common procedures, but no 
integrated military command. The strategy of change by rapprochement 
on the political-military level can be exemplified by several develop-
ments. 
 
To start with the Eurocorps, the announcement of the La Rochelle 
summit in 1992 to extend the Franco-German brigade to a multinational 
corps produced some irritation in Washington because it was inter-
preted as a French attempt to undermine the military integration. Paris 
at first tried indeed to separate the German contingents from NATO 
command by arguing that the Eurocorps should operate only under 
WEU command. But it finally gave way to a solution tied down in a 
bilateral agreement between the commander of the Eurocorps and 
SACEUR that enables French forces to come under NATO’s opera-
tional command in time of crisis provided certain conditions ( prior 
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Franco-German agreement, mission plan approved by France, corps be 
engaged as such) are fulfilled.23 On the one hand, Paris made a step 
towards NATO, on the other hand the Eurocorps „as such“ became not 
part of the integration system of NATO though the German contingent 
remained formally assigned to it. In the Toulouse declaration of May 
1999 France and Germany agreed to transform the Eurocorps into a 
European Reaction Corps with a deployable headquarters (outside 
NATO) that could perform as a core element of European CJTF.24 
 
Due to emerging conflicts in the Balkans, Paris in practice increased 
cooperation with NATO’s military structures.  
· For example, at first NATO and WEU naval forces operated sepa-
rately in the Adriatic Sea until they were combined in June 1993 
coming under operational control of NATO’s integrated military 
command subject to the political authority of the Councils of 
NATO and WEU.  
· In order to achieve better coordination in former Yugoslavia France 
established new military missions with NATO’s integrated military 
structure and expanded its direct links to SHAPE.  
· After having experienced the traps of a double chain of command 
in Bosnia France participated in the NATO led operation „Joint En-
deavour“. A special land-forces deputy commander to the Allied 
Forces Southern Europe had to be created to give Paris influence 
on IFOR’s operations.  
· NATO’s Extraction Forces established in November 1998 for the 
evacuation of the OSCE verifiers in Kosovo were its first exclu-
sively European mission with France contributing the main share of 
the contingent as a lead nation.  
· France not only participated intensively in operation Allied Force 
but it also accomplished influencing NATO’s target planning from 
the highest political level. A report for the French Senate stated that 
France operated without any difficulties within the Alliance while 
being the advocate of „the primacy of politics“ over the military hi-
                                                                 
23  See Grant, op. cit., p.61. 
24  See Erklärung von Toulouse, 29 May 1999 and Interview with Alain Richard in 
Le Monde, 14 July 1999, p. 3. 
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erarchy.25 So France came closer to NATO in practical terms but 
resisted to cross the Rubicon of reintegration.  
 
Paris regarded the traditional military integration not only as incompati-
ble with its concept of political control and autonomy, but also with the 
necessary military flexibility with regard to the new challenges of crisis 
management and the need for much more political consideration than in 
the case of the traditional Article 5 scenario of Cold War times. 
NATO’s CJTF concept was therefore welcomed as a crucial innova-
tion leading to both a true reform of NATO’s military structure and an 
autonomous ESDI. But shortly after the 1994 Brussels summit differ-
ences emerged between Washington and Paris as to the role of the In-
ternational Military Staff (IMS) in planning and organizing CJTF.26 
 
In the French perspective there were two arguments that called into 
question the US position of merely adapting the IMS: First, it is to 
clumsy for the new type of missions, and second, an adequate political 
control over SACEUR is not guaranteed. Therefore Paris preferred 
CJTF to be implemented rather outside the integrated command by 
enabling also national or other multilateral commands to provide the 
headquarters, a position that was opposed to the US approach of using 
existing NATO commands.  
 
In 1996 the NAC’s Ministerial Meeting in Berlin arrived at a tentative 
compromise when stating „this concept (of CJTF, H.G.E.) will facili-
tate the mounting of NATO contingency operations, the use of separa-
ble but not separate military capabilities in operations led by WEU, and 
the participation of nations outside the Alliance...“. As to ESDI, it 
would be based on an „elaboration of appropriate multinational Euro-
pean command arrangements within NATO, consistent with and taking 
full advantage of the CJTF concept, able to prepare, support, com-
                                                                 
25  Le Monde, 6 July 1999, p. 6. US General Short confirmed this statement from an 
American point of view complaining that France was especially responsible for 
having delayed the expansion of Serbian targets until late in the air campaign. See 
International Herald Tribune, 22 October 1999, p. 5. 
26  See Grant, op. cit., p.66ff. 
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mand and conduct the WEU-led operations.“27 The French Defense 
Minister welcomed the results as a huge step towards a „profound 
renovation“ of the Alliance.28 However, it was merely a step.  
· On the one hand, the US softened its position by becoming more 
open to modular concepts; on the other hand, France gave its con-
sent to the primacy of NATO and the preservation of the inte-
grated military structure.  
· Further, a European chain of command was accepted, but within 
NATO by double hatting.  
· Moreover, with the creation of a Political Coordination Group the 
Allies took the French wish into account to strengthen political-
military cooperation and the political control of the NAC.  
· And the creation of the Capabilities Coordination Cell as a body of 
military staff experts to support the Military Committee in develop-
ing guidelines for the non-article 5 contingency planning corre-
sponded to the French interest in strengthening the MC at the ex-
pense of the integrated military structure.  
· Finally, both the mechanisms allowing the Europeans the use of 
NATO assets and the question of the duration of the right of dis-
posal remained open to discussion.29 
Three years later the allies adopted a framework document on the re-
lease of NATO assets and US capabilities for the WEU, and France 
accepted the principle of non-automatism as well as the possibility of a 
withdrawal of these assets.30 Thus, CJTF can be interpreted as an am-
biguous approach confirming the adaptability of NATO and the rap-
prochement of France as well as the French strive for a more autono-
mous Europe. 
 
The French strategic goal to qualify NATO’s military integration to the 
benefit of ESDI was also expressed by its efforts to make the new 
power sharing between Europe and the US visible. A first success was 
                                                                 
27  NATO Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 
Berlin, 3 June 1996.Press Communiqué M-NAC-(96)63, para. 6. 
28  Charles Millon, Vers une nouvelle alliance, Le Monde, 11 June 1996, p. 1. 
29  See SIPRI Yearbook 1998, p. 158. 
30  The term „NATO assets„ usually embraces real NATO capabilities such as the 
military staffs or AWACS and US capabilities such as strategic lift and C4ISR. See 
Kori Schake, Amaya Bloch-Lainé and Charles Grant, Building a European Defence 
Capability, Survival, No. 1, Spring 1999, pp.31f. 
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the new definition of the European Deputy SACEUR’s responsibilities 
who acquires a distinct role at normal times and in the context of WEU-
led operations in relation to the forces to be made available to the 
WEU.31 Although the French ambition to install an equal European 
SACEUR responsible for non-article 5 tasks beside the American 
SACEUR responsible for collective defense failed Paris succeeded in 
obtaining a certain amount of visibility in the case of European-led 
CJTF.32 But this achievement was blurt by the failure to Europeanize 
NATO’s Southern Command (AFSOUTH). This undertaking was of 
high importance for Paris for three reasons:  
· First, it was seen as a symbol of re-balancing the American influ-
ence and of strengthening ESDI against the background of the on-
going reform of the NATO command structure. 
· Second, France has strategic interests in this highly volatile region 
as have other European players who initially supported the French 
ambition.  
· Third, after its rapprochement with NATO which was perceived as 
a prior concession, Paris believed that the US owed this Command 
to France.  
Whereas the Berlin compromise was the ultimate concession and the 
end of a process for Washington, for Paris it was just the beginning. 
This is not the place to discuss why even the compromise formula – a 
rotating French-Italian-Spanish command, the 6th fleet under US com-
mand - of this initiative failed.33 The essential point in our context is that 
France reacted to the US position by freezing the process of rap-
prochement with NATO. However, this did not mean that the project 
has been skipped and that there was no possibility for bilateral US-
French military cooperation.34 
                                                                 
31 Until recently the DSACEUR used to be a British General. In December 1998 
London and Berlin agreed to let the command rotate with a German general whe-
reas the Germany consented to enter a rotation scheme with Great Britain regar-
ding the former „German turf„ of Chief of Staff. See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zei-
tung, 18 December 1998, p. 1. 
32  See Peter Schmidt,  Frankreichs Verhältnis zur NATO: Annäherung oder Imple-
mentierung gaullistischer Prinzipien, unpublished paper, January 1996, p.11. 
33  See to this Jean-Pierre Froehly, Frankreichs neue NATO-Politik, Österreichische 
Militärische Zeitschrift, No. 3, 1998, p. 268f. See also Joseph Fitchett, Early E-
lections in 1997 Halted France’s Long Journey Back Into NATO, International 
Herald Tribune, 3 July 1998. 
34  See International Herald Tribune, 7 October 1997, pp. 1, 12. 
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Already the Petersberg declaration of 1992 identified the objective of 
developing operational capacities. In the meantime, new institutions 
were set up, such as a planning cell, a satellite center, a situation center, 
a military committee and forces answerable to the WEU (FAWEU) 
comprising 2,600 units (battalion, air squadron and ship levels) from 24 
nations, including associate partners and observers. They include seven 
multilateral formations ranging from the Eurocorps, the German Dutch 
Corps, the Multinational Division Central, the Unites Kingdom-
Netherlands Amphibious Force, Euromarfor, and Eurofor to the Span-
ish-Italian Amphibious Force.35 To guarantee  political control and stra-
tegic guidance the German EU presidency has proposed in a report 
annexed to the Conclusions of the European Council of Cologne  
· meetings of the General Affairs Council including, if appropriate, 
the defense ministers; 
· the creation of a standing political and security committee, which, 
as Chirac put it, „should be to the European Union what the Atlantic 
Council is to NATO“,36 
· the setting up of a military committee and  
· the creating of a military staff including a situation center.37 
At the first official meeting the EU’s  Foreign and Defense Ministers 
decided in November 1999 that these two committees will be created in 
2000.38 While these institutional renovations are meeting French basic 
ideas of an autonomous European defense entity Paris wants to make 
sure that, in contrast to the military committee, there is no double hat-
ting in the political and military committee, thus apparently shying  too 
close political relations with NATO.  39 
 
5. Towards Nuclear Rapprochement 
 
                                                                 
35  See Stephan de Spiegeleire, From Mutually Assured Debilitation to Flexible Res-
ponse: A New Menu of Options for European Crisis Management, unpublished 
paper, Paris 1998, p. 9.  
36  Jacques Chirac on 26 August 1999, http://www.info-france-
usa.org/news/statmnts/chi2608.htm 
37  See  Europäischer Rat in Köln am 3. Und 4. Juni 1999, Presse- und Informat ions-
amt der Bundesregierung, Bulletin, No. 49, 16 August 1999, S. 532 – 335. 
38  See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16 November 1999, p. 2. 
39  Le Monde, 26/27 September 1999, p. 6. 
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At the nuclear political level one can also state a tendency of rap-
prochement, especially if one takes into account the whole period of 
time starting from the 1950s. According to recent research findings US 
President Truman in January 1952 authorized the storage of nuclear-
capable delivery vehicles at strategic air command bases in French Mo-
rocco without informing France.40 The American refusal to support 
French military nuclear ambitions and to inform Paris of nuclear plan-
ning regarding US nuclear weapons stationed on French soil had a cata-
lytic effect on the French nuclear program that had already been started 
in the Fourth Republic and thereafter accelerated by de Gaulle.  
 
Neither the proposal of a nuclear Multilateral Force (MLF) nor the Brit-
ish-US Nassau agreement were acceptable because both were equal to 
dependence upon Washington in an issue of vital importance. Following 
Pierre Lellouche the Nassau agreement strengthened French opposition 
against a British EC membership41, already casting a light on a possible 
European function of an independent „force de frappe“.  In addition, the 
new US nuclear strategy of „flexible response“ was incompatible with 
French strategic thinking. The attainment of the nuclear status allowed 
Paris in 1966 to bring the process of leaving NATO’s integrated military 
structure to an end and to pursue an independent defense policy.  
 
In the 1970s and 1980s some a steps of rapprochement were under-
taken albeit rather from the side of US and NATO. To begin with 
NATO’s 1974 Ottawa declaration in which the foreign ministers of the 
Alliance for the first time publicly referred to the French and British 
nuclear forces and declared that they contributed to the strengthening 
of NATO’s deterrence. Furthermore a French-US covert nuclear con-
nection evolved since 1973/74 transferring to Paris know-how in areas 
such as MIRV-technology, electromagnetic hardening, solid fuel tech-
nology and underground testing. In addition in the mid1970s the French 
chief of general staff and SACEUR began a dialogue on the respective 
                                                                 
40  See International Herald Tribune, 21 October 1999, pp. 1, 4. 
41  See Pierre Lellouche, Légitime défense. Vers une Europe en sécurité au XXème 
siècle, Préface de Charles Millon, Paris: Editions Patrick Banon 1996, p. 56. 
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nuclear planning that led to a certain coordination although not compa-
rable to  the cooperation within the Nuclear Planning Group.42 
 
Also Mitterrand’s famous speech in the German Bundestag when he 
ardently lobbied in favor of NATO’S double track decision should be 
mentioned. Another aspect was the evolution of French nuclear strategy 
animated by the introduction of tactical (so called „pre-strategic“) 
weapons towards a sort of „flexible response“ á la franVaise that led to 
greater room of maneuver in the field of nuclear as well as conventional 
cooperation. Finally, leaving aside the internal strategic debate in France 
and the intensifying bilateral security relations between Bonn and Paris it 
is sufficient in our context to recall the 1986 Franco-German declara-
tion which stated that the French President will consult the German 
Chancellor  on a possible use of nuclear forces if time allows.43 
 
The change of the international security landscape since the end of the 
last decade led to a devaluation of nuclear forces. This process found 
its expression in NATO’s strategic concept of 1991which radically 
reduced the reliance on this kind of weapon.  NATO’s and France stra-
tegic thinking converged as the former’s nuclear war fighting approach 
was superseded by the political purpose of deterrence.  Now notions 
such as  „sufficiency“ and „prestrategic“ cherished by Paris became 
generally accepted within the Alliance and elsewhere so that France 
could leave its nuclear Maginot line.  
 
While NATO adapted its nuclear force posture by reducing the number 
of its prestrategic forces by 80 per cent and by removing all warheads 
assigned to these forces from the NATO inventory, France embarked 
                                                                 
42  See Richard H. Ullman, The Covert French Connection, Foreign Policy, No. 75, 
Summer 1989, pp. 3 – 33.  
43  See for this Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Die europäische Herausforderung. Frankreich 
und die Sicherheit Europas an der Jahrhundertwende, Baden-Baden: Nomos; 1990, 
pp. 19 – 22 and 40 - 45. As for the new nuclear consenus in France in the 1990s 
see Pascal Boniface, France And the Dubious Charms of a Post-Nuclear World, in 
David G. Haglund (Ed.), Pondering NATO’s Nuclear Options. Gambits for a Post-
Westphalian World, Kingston: Queen’s University 1999, pp. 152 – 155. German 
proposals to define adequate consultation procedures were declined by Mitterrand. 
See Hubert Vedrine, Les mondes de FranVois Mitterrand, Paris: Fayard 1996, pp. 
413 – 414. 
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on the train of nuclear arms control and disarmament once so distrusted 
by the guardians of the Gaullist orthodoxy. In 1992 it adhered to the 
NPT and it became the first nuclear weapon state to embrace the Com-
prehensive Test Ban Treaty. Paris became member of the Treaties of 
Rarotonga and Pelinbada which call for the denuclearisaton of the South 
Pacific  and Africa. On the unilateral level it disarmed its gravity bombs 
and its Pluton short-range missiles, mothballed the successor Hadès 
missiles, reduced the number of nuclear armed squadrons and subma-
rines, decided to close its launching base for intermediate nuclear forces 
at the Plateau d’Albion and reduced the state of alert of the strategic 
forces.44 
 
The rationale behind this shift in French nuclear policy was multifaceted 
ranging from strategic over financial and technical to political aspects. 
Despite all international changes the principle value of nuclear forces 
remained undisputed. Following a French strategic thinker they still 
have a function for the very survival of the nation, national identity, 
crisis management, bargaining power, anti-hegemonic compensation 
and political influence in Europe. As to the latter point, the then under-
secretary of defense Jacques Mellick stressed in a colloquium on the 
future of nuclear weapons that there will be no post-nuclear era be-
cause of  
· still existing security risks, 
· the uncertainty of US presence in Europe and  
· the emerging European defense.45 
 
A few days before President Mitterrand had turned a page in French 
nuclear policy when he asked at a European summit meeting whether a 
European nuclear doctrine was conceivable.  Shortly after the signing 
of the Maastricht Treaty he posed the question of a European role of 
French nuclear forces provided that the CFSP project materializes. In 
this context Mellick mentioned four options:  
                                                                 
44  See Hans.Georg Ehrhart, Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der EG 
und die Nuklearwaffenfrage, in Oliver Thränert (Hrsg.), Die EG auf dem Weg zu 
einer Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, Bonn: Forschungsinstitut der 
Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung; 1992, pp. 51f. 
45  See ibid. pp. 54f. 
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· status quo based on indirect deterrence („dissuasion par constat“),  
· American-like extended deterrence,  
· concerted deterrence and  
· common deterrence presupposing the existence of an adequate 
European political entity.46 
 
In 1992 France intensified nuclear dialogue with Great Britain. Three 
years later Foreign Minister Alain Juppé rekindled the discussion of 
linking the French nuclear arsenal to European security. First in January 
and then in September 1995 he stated publicly that the future role of 
British and French nuclear arms must be thought over and a new form 
of concertation especially with Germany should be developed in the 
nuclear field. In January 1996 Paris announced at a NAC meeting in 
Brussels its readiness to enter consultations with NATO on questions of 
a common nuclear strategy, and the 1997 – 2002 defense plan stated 
that European cooperation on deterrence implies a dialogue with the US 
within the Alliance. Finally in December 1996 the Bonn and Paris gov-
ernments agreed in a Common Strategic Concept to engage in a dia-
logue on the role of nuclear deterrence in the context of a European 
defense policy.  
 
So what does France mean when it talks of „concerted deterrence“ and 
which significance does this approach have for its alliance policy? Con-
certed deterrence means, as Juppé cautiously put it, „a dialogue be-
tween two equal partners...on a subject touching upon their common 
future existence“.47 This coordinated policy which has nothing to do 
with common decision making could in theory embrace a variety of 
relevant topics such as doctrinal questions, nuclear arms control and 
disarmament, cooperation in fields of the nuclear environment (i.e. non-
nuclear areas relevant for the credibility of nuclear deterrence such as 
C4ISR, delivery vehicles or Theatre Missile Defense), a consultation 
mechanism for crisis management with eventual nuclear implications, 
                                                                 
46  Ibid. pp. 55ff. 
47  Address of Primeminister Alain Juppé on 7 September, Französische Botschaft, 
Frankreich-Info, No. 27, 1995, pp. 1 – 8. 
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military planning or the adoption of a common European  nuclear strat-
egy.48 
 
Leaving aside Chirac’s short-term motives such as diversionary tactics 
because of the storm of protest provoked by nuclear testing the strate-
gic goal is to give the French nuclear weapons a role within the emerg-
ing ESDI which from the Paris point of view is not imaginable without 
a nuclear component. In this context Paris wants to achieve both en-
hanced legitimacy and European burden-sharing. The former is neces-
sary because of the diminishing role of nuclear weapons in the new 
security environment and their dwindling acceptance in the European 
and especially German public. Obvious reasons for the latter are the 
reduction of nuclear submarines implying a coordinated approach with 
Great Britain, the option of a NATO style dual-key arrangement with 
France keeping national control over the air based nuclear weapons and 
its partners providing for the delivery systems, the search for political 
support in the case of a reversal of US nuclear policy in Europe, and the 
primarily financially motivated need  for cooperation in technologies of 
the nuclear environment at a time of diminishing defense budgets and 
rising investments in the restructuring of the conventional force pos-
ture.49 
 
As to NATO Paris has made it perfectly clear that a reintegration in the 
NPG and its subcommittees is out of the question. What is imaginable is 
coordination with the NAC. Some thoughts were given to the creation 
of a nuclear planning group within the WEU by the Gaullist defense 
expert Francois Fillon,50 but this idea was unheeded by the European 
partners as was the offer of concerted deterrence. For Germany the 
latter makes sense only within NATO. If Paris wants to offer an addi-
                                                                 
48  See Lellouche, op. cit., pp. 265 – 269. See also Bruno Tertrais, Nuclear Policies in 
Europe, Adelphi Paper 327, March 1999, pp. 61ff.  
49  See FranVois Fillon in Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, No. 6, 1992, pp. 
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tional nuclear umbrella so why not doing so inside the Alliance?51 The 
French answer could be: That depends on the nature of the Alliance.  
 
France’s nuclear rapprochement with the US was underlined by coop-
eration with Washington in the exchange of simulation data,52 the open-
ing of US nuclear weapon laboratories  for French scientists and the 
support for a high-performance laser lab near Bordeaux.53 As to the 
proliferation issue both countries are finding more and more common 
ground. On the one hand, Paris has problems with some elements of 
the US counterproliferation approach because of a sometimes suspected 
hidden agenda and out of concern that this policy does not lead to di-
minished credibility of the „force de frappe“. On the other hand, it iden-
tified NBC proliferation as a major challenge in its 1994 White Paper 
and views cooperation among allies in this area as absolutely necessary. 
This was reflected by France’s co-chairing with the US of NATO’s 
Defense Group on Proliferation which was created following NATO’s 
1994 Brussels summit, but also by its efforts to address the prolifera-
tion issue in the WEU. 54 
 
Despite all the steps outlined above the French rapprochement with the 
US and NATO in the nuclear field is rather modest. The bilateral coop-
eration with the US is primarily driven by Washington’s concerns with 
regards to strengthening the international nonproliferation regime and 
improving safeguards of French nuclear arms. While the new interna-
tional environment pressed Paris to join  the  nuclear arms control and 
disarmament process the technological gap advised to cooperate with 
Washington. Nuclear concertation takes place neither in the NAC nor in 
the WEU. The bilateral dialogue with London is continuing but with no 
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tangible results in the nuclear field,55 and the discussion with Berlin on 
concerted deterrence faded away shortly after it had begun. Foreign 
minister Fischer’s no-first-use initiative indicated that the doctrinal di-
vergences have intensified since the Schröder government took office. 
Nevertheless Paris has undertaken a certain rapprochement also in this 
field. Although the timing of Juppé’s offer is disputable France made 
known to its partners that it is willing to cooperate on the nuclear issue. 
It also made clear that the nuclear dimension remained both the core of 
France’s defense policy and of an autonomous European security 
structure.  
 
6. Conclusions: All Roads Lead to Rome  
 
The goal of containing US power does not preclude cooperative rela-
tions between Paris and Washington. This is all the more true, if the 
relationship is of an asymmetric nature and major security interests can 
be preserved only by the US and NATO. Furthermore a strategy of 
cooperative engagement usually bears better chances to change the 
international environment provided you have something to trade with. 
Hence, France adapted its approach towards NATO during the 1990s 
following the strategy of „change by rapprochement“ that Egon Bahr 
designed at the beginning of the 1960s for the long-term unification 
process of Germany. Its essence consists of three elements: acknowl-
edging the realities, waving a net of bi- and multilateral relations and 
thereby gradually changing the realities in favor of the strategic goal. A 
French editorialist put it like this: „To be more European tomorrow, one 
has to be more Atlantic today“.56 
 
It is obvious that there has been a rapprochement with the Alliance on 
the political, the politico-military and even the nuclear level. While the 
political rapprochement with NATO has been frozen the practical mili-
tary cooperation is improving. Paris is preparing the ground for this by 
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its radical military reform announced in February 1996 that not only 
leads to an all volunteer army specialized for interventions but has al-
ready resulted in new command structures for common operations with 
allies. In the nuclear field the cooperation with the UK and the US grew 
in the 1990s but the main stumbling block remains France’s reluctance 
to join the relevant bodies of NATO’s integration structure. Hence, the 
rapprochement is a gradual one. Varying on a subtitle once used by 
Peter Schmidt57 I would say that Paris is pursuing both rapprochement 
with NATO and (instead of or) implementing Gaullist principles. 
 
Does this gradual change of NATO policy fit in the French security 
paradigm? From a subjective point of view it does because the policy of 
rapprochement offers some advantages. First, it facilitates know-how 
transfer in sensitive areas such as simulation. Second, the CJTF com-
promise although not fully satisfying for Paris enables the recourse to 
NATO assets and capabilities thus widening the military room of ma-
neuver and strengthening ESDI. Third, a certain convergence of inter-
ests with the main European allies UK and Germany could be estab-
lished. Fourth, the legitimacy of the „forces de frappe“ might have been 
strengthened. Fifth, France got more influence on the reformation of 
NATO and its missions. Sixth, it has prevented the emergence of an 
Alliance with  too strong a German influence. 
 
But to get these benefits Paris had to invest politically. Now it seems at 
a crossroads dealing with growing constraints and dilemmas. To men-
tion only a few:  
· The reunified, stronger and more assertive Germany suggests an 
acceleration of the EU integration process, but how to preserve 
one’s relative national sovereignty at the same time?  
· The US is the only real world power worth this name with a ten-
dency to unilateralism, but how to balance Washington without 
European integration?  
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· Having left NATO’s military integration for the sake of national 
sovereignty, how realistic is an approach that in essence aims at a 
strong Europe with weak institutions (intergovernmentalism)?  
· Or to put it the other way round: Is it imaginable to forge strong 
European institutions without changing the French security para-
digm of national sovereignty? 
· On the military level one might ask: If the nuclear dimension is an 
integral part of ESDI, is not there a risk of duplication with NATO 
arrangements similar to that which is already emerging on the con-
ventional level which could give support to isolationist and unilater-
alist circles in Washington and end up in US military disengagement 
thereby enhancing the urgency of European integration? 
· Such a contingency could eventually be countered by France’s 
return in NATO’s integration, but again: Would this be compatible 
with the Gaullist security paradigm?  
 
Despite all these dilemmas I think that the French security paradigm has 
entered a process to change. It is doing so slowly and incrementally, 
driven by the changes of the international environment and by the spill-
over effects of other European integration areas such as the monetary 
union. At the same time France is looking for ways to build a new 
Rome corresponding to its ambitions. In this respect, much will depend 
on the political will of France’s European partners to implement the 
decisions of the European Council of Cologne and Helsinki on the 
strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and De-
fense. If the outcome will be a European Rome or the renovated  trans-
atlantic one remains to be seen. Hence, the quarrel with the „hyper-
power“ and symbiotic partner America will go on.  
 
 
 
 
